

1918—



—1945

Alfred University Reading Room

Alfred

New York

Entered as 2nd class matter

ALFRED UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN

An interpretation of current international events by the Research Staff of the Foreign Policy Association

FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION, Incorporated

22 East 38th Street, New York 16, N. Y.

VOL. XXIV, No. 38

JULY 6, 1945

HOW CAN U. S. BEST PROMOTE UNITY IN CHINA?

THE statement by War Minister Chen Cheng on June 6 that there had been "isolated cases" of Kuomintang-Communist clashes in the past few months, and the decision of the Chinese Communists not to participate in the forthcoming session of the People's Political Council, advisory body of the Chungking government, are symptomatic of the deteriorating political situation in China. The gap between the two main groups is growing visibly, and each is taking steps to strengthen itself for a possible showdown. The spectre of civil war, never wholly absent during the eight years of Chinese resistance, is becoming more threatening now that the Japanese are withdrawing troops from large areas south of Shanghai and the Yangtze river. As Central forces reenter cities given up by the enemy, they draw nearer the bases held by the Communists. What will happen when the Chinese armies of Chungking and Yen-an meet on an extended front is a question that concerns the entire world.

NO TIME FOR ILLUSION. Recently there has been a tendency in the United States to gloss over the dangerous realities of Chinese politics and to draw comfort from superficial developments. For example, the resolutions adopted by the Kuomintang Congress in May have been welcomed for their pledges of constitutional government in the future. But beneath the surface little reason for optimism appears, since the lack of political harmony in China is more pronounced than ever. Certainly disunity is far greater than in the period—less than a year ago—when General Stilwell and Ambassador Gauss were exerting strong pressure for a genuine relaxation of one-party rule by the Kuomintang and the welding of all Chinese armies into a more unified and effective fighting force. Perhaps the mission now being sent to Yen-an by the People's Political Council will have a useful effect, but it would be un-

wise to exaggerate the power of this committee.

A disturbing element in the political situation is the possibility that some American policy-makers have become resigned to the existing disunity in China and have decided to drift along with political conditions as they are. The danger is that if internal differences are not adjusted, a political explosion may occur immediately after the Pacific war is over, or before Japan has been defeated.

It is true, of course, that the United States cannot by itself determine the future of China and that even the wisest policy might not be wholly successful. It is also true that the Chungking government is the officially recognized, national government of China and that our attitude toward it can be justified on this ground alone. But no policy is likely to be effective if it is based largely on diplomatic forms and avoids the realities behind the scenes. One of these realities is the fact that the Central régime could hardly maintain itself against political opposition in its own territory or against Yen-an without American support in the form of military assistance and economic aid. Undoubtedly the United States has an important interest in Chungking's resistance to Japan. But in supporting this interest we cannot escape a large measure of responsibility for Chungking's actions. Our responsibility would become even greater if civil conflict were to develop.

WHAT CHINA MEANS TO US. The difficult task before the State Department and the American people is to formulate a policy that will best serve the interests of the United States in an extremely complex situation. These interests are three-fold: to secure maximum military aid from China in the war against Japan; to encourage the development of a China that will contribute fully to the preservation of post-war peace in the Pacific; and to promote the rise of a large-scale Chinese market for Ameri-

Contents of this BULLETIN may be reprinted with credit to the Foreign Policy Association.

can goods. The time seems to have come to recognize anew what many American leaders apparently saw clearly a year ago: that none of these interests can be advanced with maximum effectiveness unless China is governed by a progressive administration, promoting the welfare of the Chinese people, and mobilizing the nation as a whole for the war against Japan as well as for post-war reconstruction. This goal, to be sure, cannot be achieved in a day, but our present course of giving Chungking what amounts to a "blank check" has the effect of encouraging an intransigent attitude on the part of the Central government and at the same time making Yen-an less amenable to compromise.

A NEW COURSE NEEDED. From a military point of view our policy today is to aid the Chungking forces alone and to render no assistance to the Yen-an troops, despite the favorable impression they made on members of the American military mission which visited them last year. It is well known that when General Stilwell was in China high American leaders were anxious to cooperate with Yen-an, as well as Chungking, partly because of the aid guerrilla armies might give to Allied forces invading the North China coast. Another reason was to avoid international complications if the Russians at some point entered the Far Eastern war and established military cooperation with the Communist forces in Manchuria and North China.

The Stilwell-Gauss approach was based on the view that politics should hasten victory, and that Japan would be defeated more quickly and cheaply if we gave support to all the effective military forces

in China. This policy was neither anti-Chungking nor pro-Yen-an, but first of all anti-Japanese. However, when serious obstacles arose inside Chungking General Stilwell was recalled, and shortly afterward, for reasons that were somewhat different, Ambassador Gauss resigned. Today a strong case can be made for pursuing once more the principles that prevailed before last November, and this time carrying them through.

An occasion for reorienting American policy is presented by the current discussions of T. V. Soong in Moscow, and it would be a hopeful augury if the United States and the Soviet Union now developed a common approach to the China situation. In any event, it is dangerous for this country to lose the opportunity to be a mediator in China by supporting Chungking to the hilt, while refusing to deal with Yen-an. There is much merit in the suggestion made by the *New York Herald Tribune* on June 29 that if efforts to settle the internal situation in China fail, the United States should perhaps "ignore bitter opposition from the Kuomintang and send American troops into the Communist areas to assist and supply the Red guerrillas who are fighting the Japanese." The editorial notes that, "with both Kuomintang and Red armies dependent on American supplies, civil war could be discouraged by threats of withdrawal of assistance from an aggressor." The adoption of such a course would mean that the United States had assumed a middle role in Chinese politics, such as it seeks in the affairs of the world at large.

LAWRENCE K. ROSINGER

(The third in a series of articles on American Far Eastern policy.)

TANGIER'S STATUS HEIGHTENS TENSION BETWEEN FRANCE AND SPAIN

A fresh crop of predictions that General Franco's régime will soon collapse has appeared as a result of mounting tension between France and Spain during recent weeks. The Maquis-led attack at Chambéry, near the Swiss frontier, on June 15, on a train carrying homeward a number of Spaniards who formerly lived in Germany, Austria and Poland, registered the popular resentment many Frenchmen harbor against Spaniards alleged to have aided the Axis during the war. More important, the resolution passed by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Consultative Assembly in Paris on May 25, calling for an Allied appeal to Franco to resign, represented a demand by the group officially appointed to represent French opinion until elections are held.

INTERVENTION UNLIKELY. Neither of these developments, however, has affected the position of Franco. The French government has sent a formal apology to Madrid for the Chambéry incident, and the Committee responsible for the anti-Franco resolution has no power to carry through the recommendation since the entire Assembly is merely an

advisory body whose suggestions are frequently ignored by General de Gaulle. Yet despite the fact that for the moment, at least, these incidents have only provided Spain with an excuse to close the frontier at a time when France is interested in procuring food south of the Pyrenees, these moves may foreshadow a stiffer French policy toward Spain. For although France is currently concerned with reconstruction, the occupation of Germany and the maintenance of basic interests in Syria, the French are also aware that they have several scores to settle with Franco's Spain.

The chief count France has against the Spanish leader is that he maintained close relations with Mussolini and Hitler throughout the war. Today the Spanish régime, which is made up of men who, without exception, have been both pro-Axis in foreign policy and proponents of Fascism in domestic affairs, is protesting that its actions sprang from considerations of expediency and the desire to keep Spain at peace. But Madrid's current efforts to woo the Western Allies with promises of friendship and

changes at home that will give Spain at least the outward forms of democracy have failed, at least as far as France is concerned. For many Frenchmen are convinced that the Axis attack in 1940 was not only facilitated by the military experience the Germans and Italians gained during the Spanish civil war but was actually encouraged by Franco. The fact that the Generalissimo has not fulfilled the demand of General de Gaulle's government for surrender of Pierre Laval, who fled to Spain on the eve of Germany's collapse, has added to French antagonism toward Spain.

FRENCH-SPANISH RIVALRY. Still another reason why the French may be expected to support, even if they do not initiate, any forthcoming move from abroad to secure a new government in Spain is that Franco immediately took advantage of their defeat in 1940. Only a few days after France's collapse Franco sent Spanish troops into Tangier, the internationalized port across from Gibraltar in which the French played the predominant role because of their strong military position in adjacent French Morocco. During the following winter, Spain abolished the international control bodies and ousted all high officials who were not Spaniards. By these moves Franco attempted to realize at least part of his régime's dream of a new Spanish empire, for Tangier had formerly been linked to Spain by ancient historical ties established when the Moors invaded Spain from North Africa.

Spain's loss of Tangier to international control occurred during the competition for Morocco that took place prior to World War I, when none of the great powers felt it could afford to see this strategic port pass into the hands of any single nation. As a result of Spain's inability to cope with the resistance of the native Riffs in the Spanish region surrounding Tangier, this *de facto* arrangement was formally replaced in 1923 by the International Statute in which Spain shared control of the Tangier zone with Britain, France and—after 1928—with Italy. Spain's acceptance of the internationalization of Tangier remained halfhearted, and the Tangier question became a focal point of Spanish suspicions regarding France. Under Franco's control, therefore, Tangier promptly became a center for Nazi agents and Moroccan "independence" parties which were supplied with money, arms and propaganda material by the Axis for the purpose of stirring up native unrest in French North African possessions. It is difficult to evaluate the results of this enemy-subsidized activity

because some of the requests Moroccan leaders are now making for greater independence undoubtedly reflect the weakened position of France during the past five years and would probably have occurred without Axis encouragement. But in any case the French, who are now forced to cope with native demands for greater local autonomy, are not likely to forget the contribution of the Tangier agents to their problems in North Africa.

FUTURE STATUS OF TANGIER. Franco is well aware that Allied victory in Europe renders his unilateral control of Tangier untenable, and on June 12, in a note to the British government which had protested his action in 1940, he offered to return the city to its international status. The Generalissimo did not, however, send a similar notification to Paris, and this fact, when considered in connection with two suggestions Spain is reported to have made to Britain for a new régime in the city, seems to indicate that Franco is determined to whittle down the French role in Tangier even if Spain does not benefit from internationalization. First, Spain informed London that, after Spanish troops evacuate Tangier, native troops of the Caliph—the local representative of the Sultan of Morocco—will maintain order in the city. In view of attempts by Moroccan leaders to gain a larger role in local administration, this proposal raises the question whether or not these native troops would be willing to move out later in favor of occupation forces sent by the great powers. In addition, Spain announced it would welcome American participation in the reoccupation and administration of Tangier. That the United States is not averse to this proposal is indicated by the fact that American representatives are now engaged with Britain and France in preliminary international discussions on Tangier, which opened on July 2. It appears, moreover, that American interests in commerce and communications throughout north and west Africa would be advanced if Washington shared responsibility for this strategic port. But it is not merely the development of native and American interests in Tangier that promises to raise complex problems of international politics in connection with the future status of the zone. If the possibility that Russia may be a party to the new arrangements materializes, the U.S.S.R. would emerge as one of the Mediterranean powers, particularly since the Kremlin is negotiating with Turkey for permission to share in the control of the Dardanelles.


WINIFRED N. HADSEL

FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN, Vol. XXIV, No. 38, JULY 6, 1945. Published weekly by the Foreign Policy Association, Incorporated. National Headquarters, 22 East 38th Street, New York 16, N. Y. FRANK ROSS MCCOY, *President*; DOROTHY F. LEBT, *Secretary*; VERA MICHAELS DEAN, *Editor*. Entered as second-class matter December 2, 1921, at the Post Office at New York, N. Y., under the Act of March 3, 1879. Three Dollars a Year. Please allow at least one month for change of address on membership publications.

F. P. A. Membership (which includes the Bulletin), Five Dollars a Year

Produced under union conditions and composed and printed by union labor.

Washington News Letter



NEED FOR REFORM OF STATE DEPARTMENT CONFRONTS BYRNES

The State Department since December 1944 has been working on plans regarding the fundamental reorganization of the country's machinery for conducting foreign affairs. The signing of the United Nations charter by the American delegation on June 26 brings to a head the need for reorganization, because this country's present diplomatic apparatus is still geared to a policy of isolation. President Truman's nomination on June 30 of James F. Byrnes as Secretary of State to succeed Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., may help pave the way for national acceptance of the change, which would involve a considerably increased State Department budget. Judge Byrnes' principal qualifications for his new post are his influence with and understanding of Congress, where he served as Representative and Senator. At the Crimea Conference in February, President Roosevelt relied on Byrnes for guidance on how Congress and the American public would react to the various proposals he was discussing with Marshal Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill.

STATE DEPARTMENT CHANGES NEEDED.

The replacement of high sub-officials—the Under Secretary and Assistant Secretaries—that customarily accompanies a change in the Secretaryship would be inadequate to meet the urgent requirements of the time. In recent years, almost every Federal agency in Washington has developed an interest in some particular foreign field, and the domestic policies of the various agencies frequently affect our foreign relations. As a result, the United States needs a State Department that can effectively coordinate these interests and policies in order to secure the consistent foreign policy that President Truman called for in his talk of June 29 with Alfred M. Landon in Kansas City. A first step toward insuring consistency would be the creation of a position of Permanent Under Secretary, akin to that in the British Foreign Office, and the broadening of the Foreign Service to include reportorial specialists in the fields of interest of the various agencies.

PROBLEMS OF THE DEPARTMENT. Improvement of the Foreign Service, whose officers serve not only on the diplomatic missions abroad but on many of the political desks in the State Department, is a primary requirement for a modernized Department. Initially, this improvement is a problem in recruitment. In the past, the salary scale, compared with the expenses of the officers, has been too low

to attract a sufficiently large number of recruits to give the Department a variegated selective choice. It is not unusual for officers to spend, in the line of duty, more than their federal income, and the reorganization the Department is devising calls for increased allowances.

The war and the profoundly altered position of the United States in world affairs have overcome, in part, the apathy that formerly figured as another deterrent to recruitment. The number of candidates for any Foreign Service examination before the war was low; today, however, both the Army and the Navy report that many men in uniform are making inquiries about the Foreign Service, and on June 29 the State Department announced that Foreign Service examinations would be given to 400 members of the armed services.

The Office of the Foreign Service, meanwhile, has been exploring the possibility of systematically borrowing Army and Navy officers for temporary diplomatic assignments, and establishing a "foreign service reserve" among civilians to be used from time to time on special tasks. During the war Foreign Service officers, as well as Army and Navy officers, have attended classes in the various colleges giving special courses relating to particular foreign countries. This educational comradeship will contribute, the State Department hopes, toward a close relationship with the military services in the future.

FOREIGN SERVICE TRAINING PROGRAM.

Reorganization of the Foreign Service will necessitate a modernized system of training. The reformers in the Department have received suggestions for stiffening the educational requirements, and abandoning the old-style entrance examination, which stressed factual questions and for which the candidate could prepare in a tutoring school, rather than profound knowledge and understanding. It has also been suggested that the Department establish a training program within the Foreign Service to fit officers for the difficult tasks of diplomacy and enable the State Department to weed out those who fail, after a period of probation, to show real ability. Since the State Department needs to develop high political capacity, as well as technical efficiency, in its Foreign Service officers, the creation of a Foreign Service Institute, on a level with the Army and Navy War Colleges, is tentatively under consideration.

BLAIR BOLLES

FOR VICTORY • BUY UNITED STATES WAR BONDS